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THE SHORTCOMINGS OF TITLE VII FOR THE BLACK FEMALE PLAINTIFF
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Various United States courts, including the Supreme Court, have decided numerous
workplace discrimination cases in the past four decades. Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced and
coined the term “intersectionality” 25 years after Congress enacted Title VII. The formal
recognition of intersectionality opened the gate for several legal scholars to criticize Title VII
jurisprudence related to plaintiffs who bring multidimensional claims-—usually women of color
plaintiffs—arguing, for example, that “complex discrimination” claimants face both structural and
ideological barriers to redress and thus fare even worse when compared to other employment
discrimination plaintiffs.
I argue that Black women bear the brunt of these structural barriers to recovery in the
current Title VII legal landscape and offer suggestions. This Article examines the way in which the
current framework courts employ in individual employment discrimination cases negatively impacts
Black female plaintiffs’ chances of success in pursuing employment discrimination claims. I use
intersectional theory as a backdrop to analyze a split among several federal appellate circuits
regarding whether to resolve claims brought by multi-dimensional plaintiffs through an
intersectional lens.
Through a review of legal scholarship, case law, social psychology, and critical race
theory literature on Title VII, feminism, and race, this Article suggests three solutions on the
executive, legislative, and judicial levels to alleviate the burden Black female plaintiffs carry in
bringing employment discrimination claims: 1) the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
should issue clearer guidelines and an analytical framework to guide courts in resolving
intersectional claims; 2) Congress should amend the language of Title VII to include “or any
combination thereof” to allow for plaintiffs to seek redress by combining two or more protected
classes; and 3) the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by creating an analytical
framework that employs an intersectional lens in Title VII statutory construction.
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The struggle for recognition is the nexus of human identity and national identity,
where much of the most important work of politics occurs. African American
women fully embody this struggle. By studying the lives of black women, we
gain important insight into how citizens yearn for and work toward recognition.
Melissa V. Harris-Perry, Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women
in America (2011).
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII” or the “Act”) to
protect individuals from workplace discrimination on the basis of their race, color, sex, or national
origin.1 Nearly 25 years later, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term ‘intersectionality’ and criticized
Title VII for failing to accommodate the types of discrimination based on the intersection of two or
more protected categories—i.e. race and sex.2 More specifically, Crenshaw and other
intersectionality scholars argued that courts have been particularly reluctant to recognize
intersectional discrimination against Black3 female plaintiffs for a number of reasons.4 As a result,
Black female plaintiffs have been required to bisect their identity in order to take advantage of the
protection Title VII affords against employment discrimination.
Two diverging cases demonstrate a split among the federal appellate circuits regarding
whether to recognize and permit intersectional claims brought by Black women alleging
discrimination on the basis of race and sex. In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly
Division,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to combine a Black
woman’s race and sex—both protected categories under Title VII—to create a new subgroup
because doing so would provide Black women with a “super-remedy” that goes beyond the intent
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
2 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex].
3 Like Professor Crenshaw, I also capitalize the “B” in “Black” “to reflect my view that Asians, Latinos,
and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun. SeeMacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516
(1982) (noting that ‘Black’ should not be regarded ‘as merely a color of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage, an experience,
a cultural and personal identity, the meaning of which becomes specifically stigmatic and/or glorious and/or ordinary under
specific social conditions’).” See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1988).
4 See infra Part II.A.
5 DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
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of Title VII.6 By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit court held in
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Association7 that Black women are a sub-group entitled to
Title VII protection against employment discrimination on the basis of their race and sex because
to deny their unique experiences would leave them without a viable Title VII remedy.8 Both cases,
and other subsequent cases, arguably turn on the use of the word “or” in the language of the Act.9
The word “or” has caused confusion about whether Congress intended for Title VII to allow
plaintiffs to bring claims alleging discrimination based on more than one protected category.10 This
confusion has fueled courts’ reluctance to embrace intersectional claims.11 The courts that have
recognized intersectional claims brought by women of color have done so under the sex-plus
rationale, which treats race as a secondary trait.12 This approach is limited, however, in that it fails
to give equal weight to a Black woman’s whole identity.13
This Article argues that Title VII’s failure to acknowledge and recognize intersectional
discrimination claims disproportionately affects Black female plaintiffs by leaving them with no
adequate remedy. I urge courts to adopt intersectionality theory to develop an analytical framework
to interpret Title VII to adequately address Black women’s claims based on two or more protected
categories. Part I provides an overview of Title VII jurisprudence. Part II provides a brief summary
of intersectionality theory scholarship and examines how different courts have analyzed cases
involving plaintiffs alleging intersectional claims. Lastly, Part III offers some solutions for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Congress, and the judiciary to consider
implementing to ensure Black female plaintiffs’ claims are adequately represented and protected by
Title VII.
I. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “unlawful” for any employer to
discriminate against an employee based on that person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.14 Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate all forms of workplace discrimination based on
6 DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
7 Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
8 Id. at 1032-33 .
9 See infra Part II.C.
10 See infra Part II.C.
11 See infra Part II.C.
12 See infra Part II.C.
13 See infra Part II.C.
14 Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or 2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
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such protected characteristics.15 A person alleging discrimination by an employer under Title VII
must generally file a timely charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the violation.16 Employment
discrimination cases typically fall within two categories:17 disparate treatment, in which an
employer intentionally discriminates against an employee based on a protected characteristic, or
disparate impact, in which a facially neutral decision or practice has discriminatory effects.18
To prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination using the three-part framework articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.19 A plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case by showing that: (i) she belongs to a racial minority; (ii) she applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite her qualifications, she was
rejected; and (iv) after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.20 Once a plaintiff has successfully
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason” for its decision.21 An employer is only required to articulate a reason,
not necessarily prove to the trier of fact that it was the actual reason for the decision.22 If the
employer is able to satisfy this burden of production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the employer’s stated reason was merely a pretext for the discriminatory decision.23 The
burden of persuasion ultimately remains with the plaintiff.24
The EEOC first articulated the disparate impact principle in 1966.25 The Supreme Court
15 See Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on Title VII: Part One, ABA GPSOLO (Jan. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2013/january_2013/primer_title_vii_part_one.html
[perma.cc/29WK-PBJT] (“The legislative history of Title VII supports the notion that Congress intended to eliminate all
forms of workplace discrimination caused by a person’s race, color, sex, religion or national origin.”).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The EEOC is the administrative agency that oversees the accomplishment of
the Act’s purposes. See id at. § 2000e-4(g).
17 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Employment Tests and Selection
Procedures (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html [perma.cc/5QWA-A5LB]
(“Title VII prohibits both ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate impact’ discrimination.”).
18 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-337 n.15 (1977).
19 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved plaintiff
Green, a Black man who worked as a mechanic and lab technician and had been laid off by defendant, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. Id. at 794.Green protested that his firing andMcDonnell Douglas’s employment practices were racially discriminatory
by participating in a stall-in. Id. Three weeks later Green applied to a position McDonnell Douglas advertised but was turned
down as a result of his participation in the protest. Id. at 796. Green filed a Title VII claim, alleging racial discrimination
and retaliation based on his race. Id.
20 See id. at 802.
21 Id. (“The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee’s rejection.”).
22 Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (internal citation omitted) (“The
defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.”).
23 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
24 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (“The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.”).
25 EEOC, Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-
71/shaping.html [perma.cc/4YVH-8MYW]. The EEOC issued a set of guidelines on employment testing, prohibiting
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adopted the EEOC’s position and established a disparate impact burden-shifting framework when
it confronted the issue of employment testing inGriggs v. Duke Power Company.26Griggs involved
a class action suit brought by a group of Black employees against their employer, Duke Power
Company (“Duke Power”). The employees alleged that Duke Power’s new policy of requiring a
high school diploma,27 or passage of a high school equivalency exam, as a prerequisite for
employment with the company violated Title VII.28 The Supreme Court, relying on the EEOC’s
employment testing guidelines, held that Title VII prohibited Duke Power from requiring a high
school education or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment
in, or transfer to, jobs. 29 The Court reasoned that the tests were unlawful because both requirements
operated to disqualify Black applicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants in jobs
where racial imbalance persisted as a result of Duke Power’s previous overtly discriminatory policy
and because neither standard was shown to be significantly related to successful job performance.30
While the Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s determination that Duke Power had not engaged
in intentional discrimination, it created a new framework to provide the Griggs plaintiffs with a
remedy. 31
The Supreme Court noted in Griggs that Congress intended Title VII to reach the
discriminatory effects of an employer’s practices, not just its intent.32 To mount a successful
complaint under the Griggs disparate impact framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case showing that a facially neutral employment decision or practice has an adverse impact on a
person based on a protected Title VII category. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the
plaintiff’s claim by showing that the challenged decision or practice is job-related and justified by
business necessity.33An employer’s practice violates Title VII if a plaintiff is able to show that there
exists an alternative practice that serves the employer’s purpose but with a lesser disparate impact
on the protected class in question.34
The Supreme Court dealt the Griggs disparate impact framework a sufficient blow when
it relaxed the business necessity standard,35 and reallocated the evidentiary burden for both the
employers from using neutral tests or selection procedures that have discriminatory effects and could not be justified by
business necessity. Id.
26 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
27 Id. at 427. Prior to this new policy, Duke Power overtly refused to hire African Americans in any
department besides the labor department, which paid less than the lowest paying jobs in all of the other departments. Id.
28 Id. at 426.
29 Id. at 434 (“Since the Act and its legislative history support the Commission’s construction, this affords
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.”).
30 Id. at 432.
31 Id. (“We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the
employer’s intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”).
32 Id. (“But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.”).
33 Id. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).
34 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430).
35 SeeWards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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plaintiff, and the defendant,36 inWards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio.37 The Court held, in a 5-
4 decision, that the plaintiff’s showing of statistical evidence of racial imbalance within a work
force was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.38 The Court
determined, instead, that a plaintiff must show the particular employment practice or decision that
created the disparity.39 The Court further ruled that the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff,
thus reversing the Griggs theory that required the employer to carry that burden.40 The employer’s
burden then solely became one of producing evidence of business necessity for its decision or
practice.41 In response to the Court’s Wards Cove ruling, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991.42 In the 1991 Act, Congress overruled aspects of the Wards Cove ruling and restored to the
employer the burden of persuasion on the business necessity question.43 Further, the 1991 Act
36 SeeWatson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988) (describing the reallocation of
evidentiary burdens).
37 490 U.S. 642 (1989). A class of nonwhite salmon cannery workers brought a disparate treatment and
disparate impact Title VII action against their employer, alleging that a variety of the employer’s hiring practices created a
racial imbalance of the work force, and had denied them noncannery positions because of their race. Id. at 647-48.
38 Id. at 650.
39 Id. at 656.
40 Id. at 659. TheWards Cove decision departed significantly from precedent. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (emphasis added) (stating that plaintiff has the opportunity to show the existence of alternatives “[i]f
the employer proves that the challenged requirements are job related”); Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (emphasis
added) (“[i]f an employer does then meet the burden of proving . . . “); Griggs, 401 U.S at 432 (emphasis added) (“[T]he
employer [has] the burden of showing . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”).
41 Id.
42 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100. In § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress set forth
the factual findings that undergird the statute:
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope
and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. The purposes of the 1991 Act were:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related” enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidance for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
43 Section 105 of the 1991 Act provides that a violation is established if the complaining party
“demonstrates” the existence of a disparate impact and the respondent “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat.
at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). According to § 104, “[t]he term ‘demonstrates’ means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion.” Id. § 104(m), 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)).
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reinstated the pre-Wards Cove Court’s interpretations of what constitutes business necessity and job
relatedness.44
II. INTERSECTIONALITY AND TITLE VII
A. An Overview of Intersectionality Theory
Kimberlé Crenshaw is credited with introducing intersectionality theory to critical legal
scholarship.45 Intersectionality seeks to acknowledge the intersection among the various identity
categories of women.46 Scholars have criticized Title VII for its use of the word “or” in its text,
claiming that the “or” has made it difficult for courts to allow plaintiffs to bring a claim on more
than one protected category.47 While some courts have interpreted the language in the statute to
allow a plaintiff to bring a claim under more than one protected category,48 other courts have refused
to do so, and instead require a plaintiff to choose one of the listed characteristics.49 The problem
with the latter construction is that women of color who allege employment discrimination based on
their status as, for example, Black women, are left without an adequate remedy because of the rigid
language of Title VII.50 And, unfortunately, Title VII cases that have addressed intersectionality
have not picked up enough traction to prompt any changes to the language of the statute or its
interpretation.51
Many scholars have critiqued Title VII’s inability to provide adequate relief for women of
44 The 1991 Act limits the legislative history that may be relied upon in its interpretation to: “No
statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying,
any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove--Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.” Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
45 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3.
46 See Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on what Makes a
Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67 (2008).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2000). Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. (emphasis added).
48 See, e.g., Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032 (arguing “[t]he use of the word ‘or’ evidences Congress’s intent
to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics”).
49 See, e.g., DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143 (holding that “this lawsuit must be examined to see if it
states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both”).
50 See Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and
Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 162 (1993) (noting that a Black female could lose her Title VII
claim that she was not hired based on her status as a Black female if the employer defends its case by showing that it has
hired Black men and that it has hired White women).
51 See Bradley A. Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 199, 214 (2006) [hereinafter Areheart, Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII] (“Despite a number of court decisions
that have validated intersectional claims, none of these decisions have generated enough publicity or been handed down by
a court with sufficient authority to set a genuine precedent in an area lacking clear guidance”); see also Serena Mayeri,
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 727 (2015) (“Despite the integral role of
intersectional experiences in informing the origins and early development of Title VII, court opinions that acknowledged,
much less discussed, intersectionality were few and far between.”).
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color because it forces plaintiffs to define their identity based on a single characteristic52 Scholarship
by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Judith Winston, Peggy Smith, and Judy Ellis has been critical of the rigid
categorical framework of Title VII. Kimberlé Crenshaw was one of the first scholars to examine
the consequences of anti-discriminatory laws’ tendency to treat race and gender as mutually
exclusive categories.53 Crenshaw theorized that Title VII’s categorical framework tends to benefit
those it was designed for—white women and Black men54—and thus, it marginalizes Black
women,55 and “guarantees that their needs will seldom be addressed.”56 Peggie Smith seems to
agree.57 Similar to Crenshaw’s analysis, Smith argued that the current single-issue framework of
Title VII, “fails to recognize that racism and sexism interact inextricably to harm Black women.”58
She similarly suggested that courts broaden their interpretation of Title VII to accommodate the
intersection between race and gender.59 Judith Winston similarly discussed the extent to which Title
VII fails to recognize the intersectionality between race and gender.60 She argued that because the
Act fails to acknowledge discrimination based on more than one protected category, Black women
in particular are more likely to be left with no adequate relief.61 As a result, courts tend to either
dismiss the case for lack of a showing of discrimination or force plaintiffs to choose one form of
discrimination over another.62 In the context of sexual harassment in the workplace, Judy Ellis
elaborated on the uniqueness of Black women’s experiences while advocating for the adoption of a
sex-race category of discrimination.63 In doing so, Ellis discussed how important it is for courts to
recognize the unique position that Black women are in when faced with sexual harassment in the
workplace in order to eradicate discrimination like Title VII was intended to do.64
B. Intersectional Claims: An Empirical Analysis
In addition to the criticism that Title VII fails to provide an adequate remedy to plaintiffs
52 See Castro & Corral, supra note 50 (noting that Title VII’s problem is the rigidly categorical framework
within which individuals must work to advance their claims); Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment
Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender,
and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 777 (1996) [hereinafter Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination].
53 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3.
54 Id. at 151.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 150.
57 See Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
21, 21 (1991) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Smith, Separate Identities] (“No other group in America has so had their identity
socialized out of existence as have black women. We are rarely recognized as a group separate and distinct from black men,
or as a present part of the larger group ‘women’ in this culture. . . . When black people are talked about the focus tends to be
on black men; and when women are talked about the focus tends to be on white women.”).
58 Id. at 23.
59 Id.
60 Judith A. Winston, An Anti-discrimination Legal Construct That Disadvantages Working Women of
Color, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 403, 412 (1991).
61 Id. at 413.
62 Id.
63 Judy Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 32 (1981).
64 Id. at 44.
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alleging intersectional claims, scholars posit that these types of claimants tend to fare worse in court
than those who allege discrimination based on a single protected category.65 In 2004, Kevin
Clermont and Stewart Schwab surveyed how plaintiffs fared bringing employment discrimination
claims in federal court.66 In general, employment discrimination plaintiffs tend to proceed to trial
more often67 and lose a greater proportion of cases than plaintiffs alleging other types of claims in
both federal district courts and on appeal.68 In another study, Minna Kotkin sampled a group of
employment discrimination summary judgment cases and found that plaintiffs who alleged
discrimination based on multiple categories lost 96 percent of their cases, compared to that of 73
percent of cases alleging general discrimination claims.69 Based on the results and her own
“anecdotal impression,” Kotkin suggested that multiple claims fare worse than single claims
because judges lack a clear doctrinal framework through which to analyze the multiple claims and
are thus likely to conclude that the more claims asserted, the less likely they are to be grounded in
fact.70
Researchers have found more evidence to substantiate the argument that intersectional
plaintiffs have slimmer victorious litigation outcomes than other plaintiffs in a more recent study.71
Rachel Kahn Best and her team randomly sampled more than 1,000 judicial opinions of federal
employment discrimination cases. The study found that non-white women are less likely to win
their cases compared to other demographics and that plaintiffs who allege intersectional claims are
only half as likely to win their cases—15 percent, as compared to 31 percent of other types of
plaintiffs.72 The study also found that out of all the groups that brought employment discrimination
claims, white women were more likely to prevail.73 The study concluded that based on its findings,
anti-discrimination law provides little protection for plaintiffs who are subject to discrimination
based on the intersection of two or more protected categories.74 Moreover, this lack of protection
limits the propensity of civil rights laws to effect social change.75
65 See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality
Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 992 (2011) [hereinafter Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages Empirical
Test]; Mayeri, supra note 51, at 714; Areheart, Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, supra note 51, at 231; Minna J. Kotkin,
Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2009).
66 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004).
67 Id. at 440. More non-employment discrimination cases—59%—end early in the litigation process than
employment discrimination cases—39%. Id.
68 Id. at 441. See also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127-29 (2009) for a similar study with updated
numbers and similar results.
69 Kotkin, supra note 65, at 1440, 1458-59.
70 Id. at 1457-58.
71 Best et al.,Multiple Disadvantages Empirical Test, supra note 65.
72 Id. at 1009.
73 Id. at 1012. White women are 38% more likely to prevail, compared to 31% for white men; 15% for
nonwhite men; and 11% for nonwhite women. Id.
74 Id. at 1019.
75 Id.
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C. Title VII Jurisprudence and Intersectionality Theory
Courts have not developed or adopted a single legal framework to address intersectional
claims under Title VII. Currently, courts are split on whether or not to acknowledge and allow
intersectional race and sex claims brought under Title VII. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Division is the seminal case on courts’ refusal to acknowledge the intersectionality of race
and gender in Title VII claims. In DeGraffenreid, five Black women brought a Title VII action
against their former employer, General Motors Corporation (“GM”), alleging that GM’s seniority
system and its “last hired-first fired” layoff policy perpetuated past discrimination against Black
women and thus violated Title VII.76 Prior to 1964, GM had not hired any Black women.77 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of GM and ruled that the plaintiffs could assert
separate claims for race or sex discrimination, but not a combination of both.78 In finding for GM,
the court noted that while the plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy if they have suffered discrimination,
they should not be permitted to create a “super-remedy” by combining two causes of action to create
a new special sub-category.79 The court explained that to allow that would be to provide relief to
the women “beyond what the drafters of [Title VII] intended.”80 In analyzing the sex and race
discrimination claims separately, the court reasoned that because GM had hired (white) female
employees before 1964, the plaintiffs’ claim that GM’s policy perpetuated past discrimination was
without merit.81 In sum, the DeGraffenreid court concluded that Title VII was not meant to protect
Black women as a category.82 Consequently, the DeGraffenreid approach leaves Black women to
define their claims based on the impact the complained about practice or policy has on white women
or Black men.83
Courts’ reluctance to acknowledge intersectionality has led to the creation of a loophole
for employers to escape liability under Title VII.84 For instance, in Moore v. Hughes Helicopter,
Inc.,85 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision declining to
certify Tommie Moore, a Black woman, as the class action representative in a sex discrimination
suit for women employed by Hughes Helicopters, Inc. (“Hughes”) due to “inadequate
representation.”86Moore brought the class action suit against Hughes on behalf of all Black female
76 DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
77 DeGraffenreid, 558 F.2d. at 482. Prior to 1970, GM had only hired one Black woman who served as a
janitor. Id.
78 See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 144.
82 Id. at 145.
83 Id. The court alluded to the fact that allowing Black women to prevail on a claim based on their status
as Black women would give them “greater standing than, for example, a black male.” Id. See also Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3, at 143.
84 See Areheart, Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, supra note 52, at 209 (discussing the creation of a
loophole for employers to escape the law that results from courts’ refusal to allow plaintiffs to plead intersectional claims).
85 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
86 Id. at 480.
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employees, alleging both sex and race discrimination in Hughes’s promotion practices.87 The court
reasoned that Moore was an inadequate representative because she had not claimed that “she was
discriminated against as a female, but only as a black female,” and thus she could not represent all
female employees.88 Moore was foreclosed from using statistical evidence that showed that
Hughes’s policy disparately impacted all Blacks (including males) and/or all women (including
whites)89 and was instead only allowed to use evidence of discrimination against Black women
specifically.90 As a result, Moore was unable to establish a prima facie case of significant
discriminatory impact against Black women.91 Moore further demonstrates that Black women’s
ability to successfully mount a Title VII claim is heavily dependent on the experiences of white
women and Black men92 and that a court’s failure to acknowledge the intersectionality of race and
sex renders a Black woman plaintiff’s complaint presumptively “groundless.”93
Other courts have elected to follow the single-factor analysis established inDeGraffenreid
and Moore in response to plaintiffs’ intersectional claims. In Lee v. Walters,94 plaintiff Patricia P.
Lee alleged that she was discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin.95 Ms.
Lee was an Asian-American female doctor at the Veterans Administration Medical Center, where
she claimed she was denied a promotion to a higher salary level.96 Lee, unlike Moore, was found to
have established a prima facie case of discrimination based on her national origin and prevailed on
that claim.97 However, the court noted that Lee had not sufficiently met her burden of proof for race
87 Id. at 478.
88 Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 479. Between January 1976 and June 1979, the percentage of white males occupying first-level
supervisory positions ranged from 70.3 to 76.8%, Black males from 8.9 to 10.9%, white women from 1.8 to 3.3%, and Black
females from 0 to 2.2%. The overall male/female ratio in the top five labor grades ranged from 100/0% in 1976 to 98/1.8%
in 1979. The white/Black ratio was 85/3.3% in 1976 and 79.6/8% in 1979. The overall ratio of men to women in supervisory
positions was 98.2 to 1.8% in 1976 to 93.4 to 6.6% in 1979; the Black to white ratio during the same time period was 78.6
to 8.9% and 73.6 to 13.1%. For promotions to the top five labor grades, the percentages were worse. Between 1976 and
1979, the percentage of white males in the top five labor grades ranged from 85.3 to 77.9%; Black males 3.3 to 8%; white
females from 0 to 1.4%, and Black females from 0 to 0%. Overall, in 1979, 98.2% of the highest-level employees were male.
Id.
90 See id. at 484–86 (explaining Moore’s failure to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Black
women were disparately impacted by employer’s promotion practices).
91 Id. at 484. The court concluded that Moore was “relying on little more than an inference of
discrimination from the bare absence of black female employees.” Id. Because Moore was not certified to represent white
women or Black men, she was unable to use general statistical evidence that showed sex and racial disparities as required
for a disparate impact claim. As a result, Moore was limited to using statistics only of Black women who were qualified to
fill the openings for the high-level jobs, which significantly shrunk the relevant statistical pool necessary to prove her
disparate impact case and consequently shrunk her chances of winning against her employer. Id.
92 See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3, at 145-146.
93 Id. at 146.
94 1988 WL 105887 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1988).
95 Id. The plaintiff introduced direct evidence showing that she was denied the promotion because the
decisional staff determined that her experience as a professor in Taiwan was not comparable to what was required in
America. Id., at *4-6. The court focused mainly on the plaintiff’s national origin as the relevant protected category in its
analysis. Id., at *7.
96 Id., at *2. This higher salary level is referred to as “chief grade.” Id.
97 Id., at *7. “The evidence as to the proffered ‘relevancy’ explanation and comparability of her Taiwanese
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and sex discrimination because “there were (white) females and [A]sian[] (men) in chief grade
positions on the Professional Standards Board.”98 Thus, similar to DeGraffenreid and Moore, the
Lee court relied on the experiences of white women and non-Caucasian men as reason to disprove
Lee’s claim of discrimination based on her status as an Asian woman.
The approach taken in Chaddah v. Harris Bank Glencoe-Northbrook, N.A.99was not much
different. Plaintiff, Kooi Lin Chaddah, alleged that her employer constructively discharged and
denied her an opportunity for promotion at her bank because of her age, race, and color.100 Chaddah
also alleged that it was the “pattern and practice” of her employer to only promote young, white
employees.101 The court, in true DeGraffenreid fashion, considered her claims separately and
determined that she had failed to offer evidence of harassment based on her age because all of the
evidence she offered referred to race or color.102 In addition, the court found that Chaddah failed to
provide sufficient evidence to establish the company’s pattern or practice because she did not show
that “other person[s] in her age category or of her racial background suffered similar discrimination”
or that there were “few or no Asian or older bank officers.”103 Accordingly, Chaddah was unable to
successfully claim that she was discriminated against as an older Asian woman, not just as a person
of Asian descent, a woman, or an older person, because the court refused to consider her claims as
intersectional.
Despite cases likeDeGraffenreid,Moore, Lee, and Chaddah, some courts have recognized
intersectional claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit led the way
in departing from the DeGraffenreid approach with its opinion in Jefferies v. Harris County
Community Action Association.104 Jefferies, a Black woman, brought a discrimination suit alleging
that her employer, Harris County Community Action Association (“Harris”), discriminated against
her based on her race and sex by denying her a promotion.105 She applied for and was denied several
promotions within the company between 1970 and 1974.106 In 1974, Jefferies applied for two
recently posted vacant positions for which she was not selected.107 Instead, Harris selected a white
woman and a Black man to fill the positions.108 The trial court dismissed Jefferies’s claims because
she failed to prove a prima facie case for either race or sex discrimination.109 The court reasoned
professorship, together with that relative to her accented speech, sustains plaintiff’s burden of proving that but for her
national origin she would have been promoted to chief grade.” Id.
98 Id., at *7 n.7. The Professional Standards Board was comprised of six or seven chief grade members
and included “women and non-Caucasians.” Id., at *2.
99 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1994), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994).
100 Id., at *1. Chaddah also claimed that other bank employees racially harassed her. Id., at *7.
101 Id., at *16.
102 Id., at *11.
103 Id., at *17 (emphasis added).
104 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
105 Id. at 1028. The plaintiff’s original claim included age discrimination but it was not considered on
appeal. Id. at 1030.
106 Id. at 1029. Jefferies was first employed as Secretary to the Director of Programs and was promoted
to Personnel Interviewer in 1970. Id. at 1028-29.
107 Id. at 1029.
108 Id.
109 Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 425 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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that because Harris chose a Black man to fill the position and a white woman previously held the
position, there was insufficient evidence to prove her claim.110 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially
analyzed Jefferies’s claims separately.111 But, ultimately, the court analyzed her claims together and
held that “when a Title VII plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against black females,
the fact that black males and white females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant and must
not form any part of the basis for a finding that the employer did not discriminate against the black
female plaintiff.”112 The Jefferies court recognized intersectional claims of race and sex by
employing the “sex-plus” analysis established in the dissenting opinion in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.113 The court argued that failing to recognize Black women as a separate and distinct
class would, in effect, leave themwithout a viable Title VII remedy.114Moreover, the Jefferies court
leaned heavily on Title VII’s legislative intent and history to determine that Congress’s use of the
word “or” in the statute “evidences [its] intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any
or all of the listed characteristics.”115 Thus, under the Jefferies analysis, Black women are
considered a protected class because both race and gender are listed as protected categories under
Title VII.116
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the Jefferies approach
110 Id.
111 Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1030-32. The court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Jefferies had failed to
prove her race discrimination claim and vacated and remanded the district court’s finding that she failed to prove her sex
discrimination claim. Id.
112 Id. at 1034.
113 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissenting), aff’d, 400 U.S. 542 (1971). A female
plaintiff brought a sex discrimination suit against an employer that had a policy, which forbade the hiring of women with
pre-school age children. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision that no sex discrimination existed. Id. at 4. Judge Brown vehemently refuted the majority’s decision
and recognized the “coalescence” between being a woman and being a mother. Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1260. The “sex-plus”
theory has become heavily grounded in Title VII and allows courts to determine that sex discrimination has occurred if the
employer treats women or men who possess an additional immutable factor differently, even where all women and all men
are not treated differently.
114 Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032-33.
115 Id. at 1032. The court also noted that the House of Representatives refused an amendment that would
have added the word “solely” to clarify that a plaintiff could only bring her case under one protected characteristic. Id. (citing
110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964)).
116 But see Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (criticizing the Jefferies court’s decision
as far reaching and allowing plaintiffs to attempt to combine too many protected categories). The Judge court found the
Jefferies position problematic, arguing that it turned employment discrimination into a “many-headed Hydra” and would
lead to protection for every possible combination of protected categories. Id. To prevent that fear from manifesting, the
Judge court limited the Jefferies analysis to sex plus one other protected immutable trait. Id. Scholars argue that Judge’s
limitation of Jefferies detrimentally affects Black women because a Black female plaintiff would have already exhausted
her plus allowance with her race allegation and would thus be foreclosed from alleging other traits, such as being pregnant.
See Cathy Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women’s Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1472 (1989). See
also Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 803-804 (1980) (criticizing Jefferies’ use of a sex-plus analysis to create a subclass of Black women);
Areheart, Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, supra note 51, at 222-223 (same); Mary Elizabeth Powell, Comment, The Claims
of Women of Color Under Title VII: the Interaction of Race and Gender, 26 GOLDENGATE U. L. REV. 413 (1996) (same).
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in the context of a hostile work environment claim.117 InHicks v. Gates Rubber Co., a Black woman
brought suit against her employer alleging racial and sexual harassment that created a hostile work
environment.118 Citing Jefferies, the Hicks court held that Title VII permits a court to aggregate
evidence of racial and sexual harassment to sustain a hostile work environment claim.119 The court
adopted the Jefferies reasoning that Congress intended the “or” in the language of Title VII to mean
that a plaintiff is permitted to bring a claim based on a combination of the protected categories.120
Recent cases have provided a more concrete approach to addressing and acknowledging
intersectional claims. Lam v. University of Hawaii121 is considered the “high water mark” within
the intersectionality and Title VII jurisprudence landscape.122 In Lam, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a claim against a university for discrimination based on a plaintiff’s race, sex, and national
origin.123 Lam was a woman of Vietnamese descent, who applied for and was denied a position as
Director of the Pacific Asian Legal Studies Program at the University of Hawaii Law School (the
“University”).124 She filed suit alleging the University discriminated against her during both stages
of the hiring process.125 The district court granted summary judgment to the University for two
reasons: 1) there was insufficient proof to attribute prejudice to the members of the faculty
committee;126 and 2) the University favorably considered two other candidates for the position—an
Asian man and a white woman.127 The Ninth Circuit, citing both Kimberlé Crenshaw128 and Judith
Winston,129 criticized the district court’s treatment of Lam’s claims as mathematical and determined
that, in using the mathematical approach, the trial court missed the mark.130 The court reasoned that,
117 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). See also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d
506 (6th Cir. 1999); Domb v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13790, at *1, *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003).
118 Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408. The plaintiff alleged that she had been subject to racial slurs and jokes, as
well as sexual harassment. Id. at 1409-10.
119 Id. at 1416–17.
120 Id. See also Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Under Title VII,
the plaintiff as a black woman is protected against discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an employer
who singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat plaintiff’s case by showing that white females or
black males are not so unfavorably treated.”); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986).
121 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). I do not intend to conflate the experiences of Asian women with those
of Black women. However, because there are so few major cases that have touched on this particular concept of alleging
intersectional claims, I use cases like Lam only as a reference point to provide context and to build my argument.
122 Kotkin, supra note 65, at 1475.
123 Lam, 40 F.3d at 1551.
124 Id. at 1554. The University conducted two searches to fill the position; Lam applied for and was
denied both. Id.
125 Id. The district court found that Lam had established a prima facie disparate treatment claim as
required byMcDonnell Douglas. Id. at 1559.
126 Id. at 1560.
127 Id. at 1561.
128 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3.
129 Judith Winston,Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981 and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1991).
130 The Court of Appeals explained:
In assessing the significance of these candidates, the [district] court seemed to view racism and sexism as separate and
distinct elements amenable to almost mathematical treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an Asian woman
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because two bases of discrimination “cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components[,] . . . the
attempt to bisect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores
the particular nature of their experiences.”131 The Lam court ultimately held that it is necessary for
courts to consider a plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on a combination of two or more
protected categories rather than focus solely on whether an employer discriminates based on one
category or another.132
Other courts have adopted the Lam model.133 In particular, the court in Jeffers v.
Thompson134 noted that some protected categories “fuse inextricably . . . [and] indivisibly
intermingle.”135 In Jeffers, a Black woman sued her employer for alleged discrimination based on
her race-and-gender combined and her age.136 In affirming her ability to bring a combined claim,
the Jeffers court reasoned that, similar to other intersectional claimants, Black women are subject
to unique stereotypes and biases as a group that neither Black men nor white women face.137 Thus,
“[d]iscrimination against African-American women necessarily combines (even if it cannot be
dichotomized into) discrimination against African–American[] [men] and discrimination against
women—neither of which Title VII permits.”138
Courts have yet to agree upon a settled approach to addressing intersectional claims. Some
courts have been unwilling to accommodate intersectionality within Title VII claims and, instead,
choose to analyze claimants’ identities separately. The courts that have found intersectional claims
permissible and protectable under Title VII have failed to gain much traction.139 These cases, while
a step in the right direction, have not articulated a clear, substantive analytical framework or
became a simple matter of performing two separate tasks: looking for racism “alone” and looking for sexism “alone,” with
Asian men and white women as the corresponding model victims. The court questioned Lam’s claim of racism in light of
the fact that the Dean had been interested in the late application of an Asian male. Similarly, it concluded that the faculty’s
subsequent offer of employment to a white woman indicated a lack of gender bias. We conclude that in relying on these
facts as a basis for its summary judgment decision, the district court misconceived important legal principles.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1561.
131 Id. at 1562.
132 Id.
133 See Nagar v. Found. Health Sys., 57 F. App’x 304, 306 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lam, 40 F.3d at
1562); Core-Boykin v. Boston Edison Co., 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 577, 581-82 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2004) (citing Lam,Moore, Hicks,
and Jefferies to support decision to permit combination discrimination claims); Fucci v. Graduate Hosp., 969 F. Supp. 310,
316 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that “[a] Title VII claim may be premised on alleged discrimination based on a combination
of impermissible factors” (citing Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562)).
134 264 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D. Md. 2003).
135 Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
136 Id. at 324-25. Jeffers claimed she was denied a promotion to two newly announced vacant positions,
which were filled by a white male and female. Id. at 320.
137 Id. at 326 (citing Smith, Separate Identities, supra note 56, at 21).
138 Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
139 See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2496 (1994)
(“Jefferies itself has not proved a durable precedent in securing judicial recognition of intersectional claims.”); Areheart,
Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, supra note 51, at 214 (explaining that even though a number of courts have validated
intersectional claims, none of them have had the authority to set binding precedent). He also notes that the Supreme Court
cited Jefferies in a footnote in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 598 n.10 (1999) but neglected to give it any further analysis.
Id.
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conceptual rationale for evaluating intersectional discrimination in the employment context.140
Some scholars have criticized Jefferies in particular for neglecting to provide answers to complex,
yet crucial questions that explain intersectional discrimination.141 Other scholars find Jefferies
problematic because of its reliance on the sex-plus rationale. They argue that the use of the theory
as an analytical framework to rationalize the recognition of the intersectionality of race and gender
misconstrues the type of discrimination Black women experience by assuming that their race is
secondary to their sex.142 Moreover, the use of sex-plus analysis in addressing the claims brought
by Black women reinforces the notion that Black women are a subclass because they deviate from
the white male norm.143 Lastly, the use of the sex-plus rationale further supports the notion that anti-
discrimination doctrine is centered on the experiences of white women and/or Black men.144While
intersectional scholars acknowledge that Jefferies signaled a shift toward recognizing multiple
claims in Title VII jurisprudence, they seem to agree that the use of sex-plus analysis does not afford
Black women adequate protection under the statute.145
III. THE SOLUTIONS
The enactment of Title VII has changed the face of the American workplace. However,
140 SeeWinston, supra note 129, at 799; Abrams, supra note 138, at 2498.
141 Kathryn Abrams believes the Jefferies court failed to give attention to the following questions:
First, should the discrimination against black women be regarded as distinct because it is quantitatively greater - as they
suffer a combination of what black men and white women receive - or because it is qualitatively different? Second, if this
difference is qualitative, is the discrimination suffered by black women utterly distinct, or can it be related, even in its
particularity, to the discrimination suffered by other groups of women? The Judge court’s description of a “many-headed
Hydra” suggests that the claims of each subgroup are highly particularized and lack common threads with the race or gender
discrimination suffered by other subgroups; the Jefferies opinion offers little ground for assessing this suggestion. Finally,
how should one describe the relationship between this intersectional form of discrimination and those previously addressed
under the statute? Are those forms of discrimination that target a subgroup less important - as Judge’s imposition of arbitrary
limits suggests – than those that target the group as a whole? Are those forms of discrimination frequently regarded as
general really as universal as they seem, or do they simply target a subgroup - white women which is not often recognized
as a subgroup?
See Abrams, supra note 139, at 2497-98.
142 See Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1470-73 (discussing how the Jefferies court’s reliance on the sex-
plus rationale fails to acknowledge the whole personhood of a Black woman); Powell, supra note 116, at 421-22 (suggesting
the Jefferies court should not have used the sex-plus rationale to analyze a Black woman’s claim).
143 Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 143 n.12. See also Powell, supra note 116, at 423 (arguing that the Judge
court “made it clear that a woman of color can only deviate so far from the norm of a White male before the claim is viewed
as too obscure”).
144 Id. at 143. See also Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1472 (arguing that courts would not construe a
white woman’s age as a plus factor because society tends to value whiteness over blackness).
145 SeeAreheart, supra note 51, at 222 (“While sex-plus analysis is somewhat helpful in the intersectional
context, it still often relegates a Title VII-protected category to the level of a plus factor.”); Abrams, supra note 139, at 2498
(“Jefferies may have opened the door to the protection of a particular intersectional category, but because it fails to describe
the conception of intersectional discrimination that animates this protection or how that conception relates to more traditional
understandings of discrimination under Title VII, the protection it offers is neither transformative nor, ultimately, even
stable.”); Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1472 (“Forcing Black women to use their single plus factor on race prevents them
from fairly addressing other issues that may contribute to their discrimination.”).
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despite the progress made, employment discrimination persists.146 And, despite the immense
amount of scholarly research on intersectionality theory, courts have been unwilling to incorporate
the theory in analyzing combined claims of more than one protected category for one reason or the
other.147 Each branch of government should consider the following suggestions to ensure that
intersectional claimants, those who arguably need the most protection from discrimination, are
afforded an adequate remedy.
A. Executive Branch: Administrative Changes
In 2006, the EEOC acknowledged “intersectional discrimination” when it issued its
Compliance Manual Section on Race and Color Discrimination to clarify its race and color
discrimination guidelines.148 The section, in relevant part, reads:
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected trait (e.g.,
race), but also because of the intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g.,
race and sex). For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination against African
American women even if the employer does not discriminate against White
women or African American men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian American
women from discrimination based on stereotypes and assumptions about them
“even in the absence of discrimination against Asian American men or White
women.” The law also prohibits individuals from being subjected to
discrimination because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered by
another EEO statute – e.g., race and disability, or race and age.149
While the EEOC cited both Jefferies and Lam in support of recognizing intersectional
discrimination as a viable cause of action, it offered no guidance to courts in interpreting Title VII
to allow for an actionable intersectional claim. Rather, it only identified that there is such a claim
and gave an example for context. The EEOC once again acknowledged intersectional claims when
it launched its Eradicating Racism and Colorism from Employment (E-RACE) initiative.150 It
explained that:
[n]ew forms of discrimination are emerging. With a growing number of
interracial marriages and families and increased immigration, racial
demographics of the workforce have changed and the issue of race discrimination
in America is multi-dimensional. Over the years, EEOC has received an
increasing number of race and color discrimination charges that allege multiple
or intersecting prohibited bases such as age, disability, gender, national origin,
146 Jenny Yang, Job discrimination still a challenge, MIAMI HERALD (July 1, 2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article26010319.html [https://perma.cc/Z7E9-LKFP].
147 See supra Part II.
148 EEOC, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTALS, EEOC COMPLIANCEMANUAL 3,
8–9 (Apr. 19, 2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#IVC [https://perma.cc/VE94-2KF3].
149 Id.
150 EEOC, The E-RACE (Eradicating Racism and Colorism from Employment) Initiative (2008),
https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/GPH4-DZM7].
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and religion.151
Once again, the EEOC neglected to provide any guidance or clarification for how a court
or the Commission might approach and analyze such a case.
That said, the EEOC should issue clear, concrete guidelines for courts to follow. The
acknowledgment of intersectional discrimination is a step, but it is merely informative, instead of
instructive. As discussed above, while Jefferies and Lam are persuasive models for courts to adopt,
neither sets a binding precedent that requires courts to follow it.152 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has neither analyzed nor interpreted Title VII to permit an actionable intersectional claim.153154
Congress previously demonstrated its power to influence the way courts interpret laws when it
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in response to the Wards Cove decision.155 Congress sought
to overturn the Wards Cove ruling because it was more deferential to employers and deviated
significantly from a previous, more favorable standard set in Griggs.156 Perhaps the EEOC could
shape the way courts analyze intersectional claims with a similar approach by issuing clear
guidelines that not only acknowledge the possibility of intersectional discrimination, but also
provide an analytical framework informed by the theory that Black women do experience
discrimination that is indeed different from that experienced by white women and Black men.157
The Commission can do so by incorporating the sociopolitical history of Black women in its
guidelines to provide a reference point for courts to accurately conceptualize Black women as their
whole selves when analyzing their claims.158Moreover, it is important for the EEOC to emphasize
that Title VII was intended to protect employees from discrimination based on any of the listed
protected categories, and it should do so regardless of whether it is based on one or all of the
categories.159
151 EEOC, Why Do We Need E-RACE? (2008), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/why_e-
race.cfm [https://perma.cc/6R3P-WTP4] (emphasis added).
152 Judge is a good example of what little precedential value Jefferies has. 649 F. Supp. at 780.
153 See supra note 140 (noting the Court cited to Jefferies but in passing and lacking analysis).
154 In May 2018, the Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge to an Eleventh Circuit ruling that an
employer did not violate Title VII by not refusing to hire a Black woman because of her dreadlocks. See EEOC v.
Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols. 138 S. Ct. 2015 (Mem); EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (11th Cir.
2016) (holding that Black plaintiff’s dreadlocks were not an immutable characteristic and thus, grooming policy banning
dreadlocks was race neutral and not in violation of Title VII).
155 See supra note 43 (discussing Congress’s response to the Wards Cove ruling).
156 See Barbara T. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy, 104 YALEL.J. 2009, 2020-22 (2009) (discussing
the Wards Cove decision and Congress’s response); Philip S. Runkel, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Continuation of the
Wards Cove Standard of Business Necessity, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177 (1994) (discussing the amendments and
compromise that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). But see Amon N. Jones & D. Alexander Ewing, The
Ghost of Wards Cove: The Supreme Court, The Bush Administration, and the Ideology Undermining Title VII, 21 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 163, 172 (2005) (arguing that Congress failed to successfully overturnWards Cove).
157 Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 140 (“Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of
racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular
manner in which Black women are subordinated.”).
158 Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1474.
159 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964) to support the argument that
Congress intended for Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of any or all of the protected categories).
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The EEOC should be prepared to defend its choice to issue such guidelines. Some courts
and critics would arguably be skeptical of recognizing intersectional discrimination as actionable
under Title VII for a few reasons. First, courts might hesitate to recognize intersectional
discrimination because of the fear articulated in Judge. The Judge court, in applying the sex-plus
analysis from Jefferies, criticized it as far-reaching and overbroad because “it turns employment
discrimination into a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain within Title VII’s prohibition.”160
While it agreed that the recognition of Black women as a distinct subgroup protected by Title VII
was “logical,”161 the Judge court sought to avoid creating protection for subgroups of every
conceivable combination of protected traits by holding that plaintiffs could only allege sex-plus one
additional immutable protected trait.162 To counter this fear, the EEOC needs to explicitly clarify
the intention of the sex-plus doctrine. The sex-plus doctrine was developed to allow for protection
from discrimination based on sex, a protected category, plus a neutral trait, such as being married
or pregnant.163 To assume protection for Black women under the sex-plus rationale is to relegate
race to the status of a secondary trait, even though it is clear that the statute equally prohibits both
race and sex discrimination.164 It is unfair to Black women for courts to have to construe race as a
secondary trait in order to grant them protection under the statute. Given that the statute was
intended to prohibit discrimination based on either category, Black women should not be required
to choose which “category” of their identity should be given more weight. True recognition of
intersectionality theory requires each trait upon which discrimination is based to be given equal
weight and consideration.165
Second, critics could argue that the recognition of intersectional claims creates new
subgroups that would receive special treatment.166 Scholars have argued that this fear is unfounded,
considering that plaintiffs alleging intersectional claims are still required to produce evidence to
substantiate their claims.167 In fact, intersectional claimants carry a heavier burden, since their
allegation of discrimination is based on a unique combination of traits.168 Moreover, courts may
exercise discretion when analyzing a plaintiff’s claim based on its merits and should not feel in any
way obligated to grant relief to plaintiffs who appear to be alleging “kitchen sink” claims.169
160 Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1258–59.
164 See infra Part II.C.
165 See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3.
166 The DeGraffenreid court reasoned that Black women should not be permitted to bring claims as such
because doing so would create a new “super-remedy” beyond what the drafters of the statute intended. 413 F. Supp.at 143.
The court further explained that allowing claimants to bring combined claims “raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed
Pandora’s box.” Id.
167 Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination, supra note 51, at 808–09; Areheart, Revisiting
a Wrinkle in Title VII, supra note 50, at 233.
168 See Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 327 (“[T]he more specific the composite class in which the plaintiff
claims membership, the more onerous that ultimate burden [of persuasion] becomes.”).
169 See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for Dismissal,
Summary Judgment, 19 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) 595 (Dec. 4, 2002) (quoting federal District Court Judge Ruben
Castillo of the N.D. Ill., who criticized plaintiffs’ lawyers “for filing wide-ranging claims alleging discrimination on multiple
levels – a strategy akin to ‘throwing a plate of spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks’”).
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B. Legislative Branch: Amendment to Title VII
The language of Title VII is partly responsible for courts’ reluctance to acknowledge
intersectional claims. The statute prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.170 The use of the word “or” in the Act
has led to opposing interpretations, with some courts insisting that it demonstrates Congress’s intent
for the Act to prohibit discrimination based on one category or another,171 and others arguing that
Title VII’s legislative history begs the converse approach.172 Intersectional scholars and some courts
have cited to Congress’s refusal to pass an amendment that would have added “solely” to modify
the listed categories as evidence of its intent to allow protection for discrimination based on more
than one protected category.173 However, others have noted that, like the EEOC guidelines, the
legislative history of the statute does not provide a clear framework for analyzing intersectional
claims.174
Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral have suggested Title VII be amended to include the phrase
“or any combination thereof” so that the statute effectively reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or any combination thereof.175
Such an amendment, they argue, would the rid the courts of the ambiguity about whether
women of color are permitted to bring combined claims and resolve the division among the
circuits.176 Law professor Bradley Allen Areheart agrees and argues that such a change would
clearly express Congress’s intent to permit plaintiffs to allege intersectional claims.177 This
amendment could also possibly reduce instances of intersectional discrimination by serving as a
caution to employers. Considering the immense costs of workplace discrimination to employers178
170 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
171 See, e.g., DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143 (holding that “this lawsuit must be examined to see if it
states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both”).
172 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 110
CONG. REC. 2728 (1964) to support the argument that Congress intended for Title VII to prohibit discrimination on any or
all of the protected categories).
173 See id. See also Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination, supra note 52, at 776;
Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1466-67.
174 See Scarborough, supra note 116, at 1466-67; Wei, supra note 52, at 776 (citing Scarborough, supra
note 116); Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1035 n.7.
175 Castro & Corral, supra note 50, at 172.
176 Id.
177 Areheart, supra note 51, at 234.
178 Center for American Progress, The Costly Business of Discrimination: The Economic Costs of
Discrimination and the Financial Benefits of Gay and Transgender Equality in the Workplace (Mar. 2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/lgbt_biz_discrimination.pdf
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and the push to improve diversity and inclusion in the workplace, perhaps employers will be more
diligent in ensuring that they are not discriminating against their employees based on one or multiple
protected categories. Ultimately, equality in the workplace would become a more attainable goal
and the purpose of Title VII would be satisfied.
C. Judicial Branch: Judicial Creation of an Intersectional Framework
It is time for courts to shift away from the traditional notion that discrimination falls
squarely on the basis of discrete characteristics. Some scholars argue that Title VII was never meant
to be interpreted through a single-issue framework.179 They contend that Title VII has intersectional
origins, and that the concept of intersectionality predated the enactment of Title VII.180 That said,
courts should consider taking into account the sociopolitical history of Black women when creating
and using an intersectional framework to analyze their claims.181 The Supreme Court has
demonstrated that it is capable of considering the history of oppression of a group in deciding
whether said group is being discriminated against in cases like Brown v. Board of Education,182
Frontiero v. Richardson,183 andUnited States v. Virginia.184 Federal appellate and district courts are
[https://perma.cc/65J8-GQP6].
179 See infra notes.
180 Mayeri, supra note 51, at 718. Pauli Murray, a Black female lawyer, wrote a memo in support of
amending Title VII as it was written to include prohibition of discrimination based on sex. Pauli Murray, Memorandum in
Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination
in Employment Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 85, Folder 1485, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Murray, Title VII Memorandum]. Murray’s memo
specifically argued in support of the amendment because she believed that the protection against sex discrimination would
fully protect “Negro women.” Murray, Title VII Memorandum. For more discussion on Title VII’s intersectional origin see
SERENA MAYERI, REASONING ROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011) (examining the
roots of feminist legal advocacy in intersectional experience); NANCYMACLEAN, FREEDOM ISNOT ENOUGH: THEOPENING
OF THE AMERICANWORKPLACE 117-54 (2006) (recognizing the pivotal role of African American feminists in shaping the
early history of Title VII); CARRIE N. BAKER, THEWOMEN’SMOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT passim (2008)
(chronicling Black women’s pivotal roles as activists, plaintiffs, and government officials in the struggle against sexual
harassment); ALICEKESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OFEQUITY:WOMEN, MEN,AND THEQUEST FORECONOMICCITIZENSHIP
IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 226-33, 240-48, 262-68, 277-80, 283-88 (2001) (discussing evolving views about the
relationship between race and sex discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s); Eileen Boris, The Gender of Discrimination:
Race, Sex, and Fair Employment, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION AND
PRACTICE 273, (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003) (describing neglect of “interactive discrimination”
faced by Black women); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 801 (2004) (exploring feminists’ “dual constitutional strategy” and its relationship to “the
interconnectedness of race and sex equality”).
181 Courts have previously taken the social, political, and economical history of an oppressed group into
consideration when analyzing whether laws disparately impact said group. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
In Frontiero, the Supreme Court recounted the “long and unfortunate” history of sex discrimination in striking down a
military benefits policy that had different proof requirements for women and men. Id. at 684-91. The Court is especially
notorious for considering history when engaging in Equal Protection Clause analysis. See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
182 347 U.S. 483.
183 411 U.S. 677.
184 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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not exempt from adopting such an analytical canon of construction to analyze employment
discrimination claims brought by Black women. From a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court is
charged with resolving splits among the circuits. Given the lack of agreement about whether
intersectional claims are actionable and whether those claims deserve to be given equal weight as
singular claims, it would be helpful if the high Court took the opportunity to resolve the split
amongst the federal circuits.
It will likely be difficult for courts to simply “create” a framework without clear,
established legal authority.185However, if the Court were to take up this cause of creating a multiple
issue framework, it should refrain from building its argument around the sex-plus rationale. The
Court can use the sex-plus rationale as a starting point, but as discussed above, the sex-plus rationale
does not adequately address the concerns of Black women.186 The Court should carefully craft a
framework that both adequately conceives of Black women’s intersectional claims and addresses
the logistical fears about which courts seem to be concerned.187 The framework should mirror
aspects of the Lam decision by ensuring that courts refrain from using a mathematical approach in
recognizing combined claims, and that they recognize the unique stereotypes and barriers that Black
women have faced and continue to face in the workplace.188 The creation and adoption of such
framework would aid in furthering Title VII’s goal of eradicating workplace discrimination based
on protected categories.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the passage of Title VII, the EEOC has made considerable progress in reducing racial
discrimination in the workplace.189 However, despite that progress, employment discrimination
based on race persists.190 Over the years, the EEOC and the judiciary have developed different
frameworks for analyzing Title VII claims.191 Scholars have criticized the traditional Title VII and
anti-discrimination doctrine as lacking protection for plaintiffs—more specifically, Black female
plaintiffs—who desire to assert intersectional claims.192 Because of Title VII’s language and the
absence of an established framework with which to analyze intersectional claims, courts are left to
arbitrarily decide how or whether to adjudicate such cases.193
185 Judge Randall was wary of the majority’s recognition of a combined claim of race and sex as
actionable because she thought the court was not in the position to deviate from the traditional framework and essentially
create a new one. She also noted the lack of legal authority to support the recognition of such a claim and pointed to the
opposing view that is DeGraffenreid. See Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 n.7 (5th Cir.
1980).
186 See supra Part II.C.
187 See supra Part II.C.
188 See Powell, supra note 116, at 432-33 (discussing why the Lam decision is a good model for analyzing
intersectional discrimination claims). Powell also points out some issues with Lam for courts to consider. Id. at 433-34.
189 See supra note 147.
190 EEOC, Press Release, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2015 Enforcement and Litigation Data:
Retaliation, Race Discrimination and Harassment Persist; Disability Charges Increase (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-11-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/HM6G-HHL3].
191 See supra Part II.C.
192 See supra Part II.B.
193 See supra Part II.C.
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Courts should permit Black female plaintiffs to bring claims alleging discrimination based
on their race and gender because refusing to do so leaves them without an adequate remedy for the
discrimination that they have experienced. The EEOC can assist courts by issuing clear guidelines
on interpreting Title VII to not only acknowledge intersectional discrimination as a cause of action,
but to adequately analyze such a claim to ensure that Black female plaintiffs are not left without a
remedy because of their unique position in society. Congress can also assist courts in building a
framework by amending Title VII to include the words “or any combination thereof” at the end of
the listed protected categories. This amendment to the language of the statute would explicitly
demonstrate Congress’s intent to permit claims based on multiple characteristics, and possibly deter
employers from discriminating against their employees based on one or more categories. Lastly, the
judiciary itself can create and apply a canon to interpret intersectional claims that is informed by
the social, political, and economic history of Black women in America in a way that effectively
redresses their claims. These solutions would hopefully close the loopholes in Title VII that leave
Black women in the metaphorical dust of employment discrimination.
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